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Abstract
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The share of ethnic groups is one of the most important features of African
politics. It affects civil wars, representation in government positions, distributive and
allocative policies. In this paper we use the partition of ethnic groups as a natural
experiment in order to estimate the effect of the share of these ethnic groups on
development. We show that larger groups have an advantage in terms of development
and that the partition in itself does not matter for development. This result is
explained by the fact that the partition matters only when the resulting groups are
relatively small, since their lack of political representation may weaken support for
institutions, may bias policies and the provision of ethnic/regional public goods.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years a large body of research has tried to explain why some countries still
lag behind while other countries have enjoyed steady long-term economic development.
Among the several explanations which have been offered, the institutional hypothesis has
been the one which has dominated the economic arena. Poorly performing political and
institutional structures, together with inefficient legal and court systems, are among the
primary causes of poor development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005;
Glaeser, La Porta, de Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, 1998; etc.). With regard to political institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
distinguish between extractive and inclusive institutions. Unlike inclusive institutions,
which are conducive to long-term development, extractive institutions are designed to
serve the interest of small elites by exploiting the rest of the population and for this reason
they are highly detrimental to development.
Africa is one of the continents which have suffered most in terms of the persistence of
extractive institutions. Inefficient property rights, patronage politics, corruption, mistrust
and unstable democratic institutions have long been proposed as sources of poor develop-
ment in the continent. Some of these institutions are the result of the slave trade (Nunn
2008; 2010). Others derive from the legacy of colonization and the subsequent Scramble
for Africa which at times has been considered even more harmful than colonization itself
(Asiwaju 1985; Dowden, 2008).
Loosely speaking, the Scramble for Africa consists in the arbitrary and improper bor-
der design which partitioned a signicant fraction of the population belonging to existing
ethnic groups. As a result, where political borders do not always coincide with pre-existing
tribal institutions (Englebert, 2000a), large shares of the population belonging to different
ethnic groups have been forced to coexist in artificial states (Alesina, Easterly, and Ma-
tuszesky, 2010). The discontinuity between pre- and post-colonial institutions has caused
illegitimacy (Englebert, 2000a), civil conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2004),
ethno-political mobilization (Posner 2004a, 2004b), and particular rather than collective
policies (Miguel, 2004). A somewhat more sophisticated interpretation of the effect of the
Scramble for Africa is provided by Posner (2004a). Focusing on the partition of the Chewa
and Tumbukas peoples between Malawi and Zambia, he argues that “the political, social,
and cultural salience of the cleavage depends on the sizes of the group that the cleavage de-
fines relative to the sizes of the political and social arenas in which the groups are located”
(Posner, 2004a, p. 543). Thus, the idea that the political salience of a cultural cleavage
results from the arbitrary imposition of boundaries in itself seems open to doubt.
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In this paper we build on the hypothesis in Posner (2004a) in order to investigate the
idea that the partitioning of ethnic groups in Africa matters only when the share of groups
resulting from the imposition of national boundaries is small in relation to the political and
social arenas in which the groups are located. To analyse the effect of partitioned groups
(and their relative share) on development, we use data at group level from Murdock (1959,
1967) which we merge with ethno-country estimates on GDP from satellite imagery of the
light density at night from the NOAA/NGDC (National Geophysical Data Center). We
initially exploit the variation across groups to show that the negative effect of the partition
is not robust to the inclusion of additional controls. After establishing that the effect of
the partition is not significant, we exploit the variation within groups in order to estimate
the effect of the share of the group on development. Exploiting the variation within groups
allows us to control for confounding variables, given that partitioned groups belonging to
the same historical homeland are likely to start from the same level of income per capita
and, share the same culture and institutions, which then neutralizes biases of this kind.
Using this sort of matching estimator we find a close relationship between the size of the
partitioned group and development. The robustness of the results is tested using a series
of different approaches. First, we use a regression discontinuity approach exploiting the
discontinuity at the border. Then we re-estimate same models using an IV estimator in
order to provide exogeneity to the share of partitioned groups and find that the results
are quite close to those estimated using the regression discontinuity approach. Finally we
change the dependent variable using household data from the Afrobarometer IV to check
the sensitivity of the results to different measures of economic development and we still
find a significant effect of the share of partitioned groups on proxies of individual income.
In order to shed light on some of the channels through which the share of ethnic groups
may affect development, we test a set of different theories which have been proposed by the
economic and political science literature. We evaluate the effect of the share of partitioned
ethnic groups on informal institutions, investment in infrastructures, and trust (which
we use to proxy community networks). Even though estimates are not causal we find
support to the idea that smaller groups tend to provide more support than larger groups
do to the informal institutions of ethnic leaders with regard to the allocation of land and
responsibility for maintaining rule and order. This finding seems to be consistent with the
idea of the persistence of customary institutions in rural areas which then may hamper
development because of weak institutions and poor enforcement of property rights. This
result is also supported by a significant effect of the share of groups on trust. In fact,
human interactions become extremely important in absence of formal institutions. As a
result groups which rely on informal institutions are likely to trust more too. We also find
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a significant effect of the share of ethnic groups on investment in infrastructures which we
proxy with the distance from railways and roads. Smaller groups are further than larger
groups from railways and roads, making the former more likely to suffer from increased
transportation costs and therefore retard regional development.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we review part of the literature
on economic development in Africa, focusing on papers related to the partition of ethnic
groups there and its effect on development. In Section 3 we discuss the sources used to
collect data and the way we have used these sources in order to carry out our analysis.
In Section 4 we provide evidence in support of the idea that it is not the imposition of
arbitrary boundaries that matters. At the same time we show a positive and significant
effect of the shares of the partitioned groups on development. In Section 5 we conduct a
series of robustness checks evaluating whether this effect is robust to alternative estimators
(i.e. IV and RD approaches) and to changes in the dependent variables. In Section 6 we
review and test some of the theories which may explain the relationship between the share
of ethnic groups and development. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.
2 Related Literature
A significant part of the literature in political science has focused on ethnic politics and the
impossibility of developing a nation-building process in a country when it has experienced
ethnic cleavages (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1996). The presence of ethnic cleavages
leads to ethno-politic mobilization (Posner, 2004b) and hence politicians find it easier to
build electoral support along ethnic lines (Eifart, Miguel and Posner, 2010). The result
of ethno-politics is to foster ethno-culture and ethno-institutions, leading to a lack of
confidence in national political institutions (Norris and Mattes, 2003).
This process seems to have a particularly severe effect on most countries in Africa
(Mattes and Gouws, 1999; Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Norris and Mattes, 2003) where
ethno-politics, the current ethnic diversity and the resulting weak institutions seem to
be the result of the Scramble for Africa followed by the arbitrary imposition of state
boundaries (e.g. Ajala, 1983; Asiwaju, 1985; Barbour, 1961; Bello, 1995; Brownlie, 1979;
Davidson, 1992; Kum, 1993; Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Touval, 1966, Englebert, 2000a,
2000b).
Building on this idea, authors have used data on whether state boundaries are repre-
sented by a straight line and the length of these straight lines in order mainly to find a pos-
sible effect of artificial state boundaries on civil conflict (e.g. Clapham, 1996; Odugbemi,
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1995; Ottaway, 1999; Touval, 1969; Bach, 1999; Nugent, 1996; Barbour, 1961; Bayart,
1996; Griffiths, 1996; Young, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002).
However the evidence is somewhat mixed.
The effect of ethnic divisions has also been widely debated in the economic literature
(Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, 2003;
Fearon, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban and Ray, 2008; Michalopou-
los, 2012). Part of this literature has focused on the effect of pre-colonial and colonial
ethnic institutions on development. Gennaioli and Rainer (2006) and Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013) document a close association between pre-colonial ethnic political
centralization and measures of national and regional development. Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou (2014a) show that differences in countrywide institutional structures across a
national border do not explain within-ethnicity differences in economic performance, as
captured by satellite images of light density. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014b)
find that support for traditional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa remains quite strong and
the persistence of this “dual” institutional environment is associated with development
divergences across areas. Heldring and Robinson (2012) compare differences in the admin-
istration of African colonies in order to evaluate the effect of colonization on development.
Englebert (2000a) looks at the continuity between pre- and post-colonial institutions and
finds in a cross-country growth analysis that institutional continuity explains the Africa
dummy effect. To proxy artificial states, Alesina, Easterly and Matuszesky (2010) use mea-
sures for whether there are partitioned groups within the country and whether the country
boundaries are represented by a straight line (which they proxy using bounding-boxes and
a fractal measure).
With respect to this literature, the paper shows that unless a group is relatively small
it is not the imposition of arbitrary boundaries that matters for development. Only in
the latter case there is a negative effect on development and this effect is beyond any sort
of effect of pre-colonial and current institutions for which we control. In addition, with
respect to Alesina, Easterly and Matuszesky (2010), the paper focuses on ethnic groups
rather than countries because it is normal to expect that the groups which have been
partitioned are the ones which are most affected by the partition.
The paper is also closely related to the literature on ethnic groups, political repre-
sentation, patronage politics and development. Rainer and Trebbi (2014) provide detailed
data on ministerial positions and ethnic groups over a 40-year period in 15 democratic and
autocratic African countries. Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2012) show that, even in auto-
cratic countries, representation is proportional to the size of the group, a finding which they
interpret as the result of political instability. Given the risk of civil wars, political leaders
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try to co-opt into government elites members of other ethnic groups. Bates (1983), Bratton
and Van de Walle (1997) and Posner (2005) document the existence of patronage politics
and the link between the ethnicity of the political leaders and public spending. Burgess,
Jedwab, Miguel and Morjaria (2010) combine district-level panel data on road building in
Kenya with historical data on the ethnicity and district of birth of political leaders to show
that presidents disproportionately invest in their district of birth and those regions where
their ethnicity is dominant. Similarly, Miguel and Zaidi (2003), Franck and Rainer (2012)
and Moser (2008) show how African leaders use public expenditure to support individuals
who come from their region of origin or share their ethnicity.
The paper is also linked to the literature on the persistence of institutions and the
effect of institutions on development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Ro-
drik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004, Alesina and Spoloare, 2003; Spoloare and Wacziarg,
2005). The analysis of limited national institutions, weak states and the inability to dis-
seminate power is also central to Acemoglu (2005), Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2011)
and Besley and Persson (2010, 2011).
From a methodological point of view, the paper builds on the literature on matching
models (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) and county-pair analysis (Dube, 2009; Naidu, 2010).
With regard to development in Africa, this methodology has been pushed forward by
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012, 2014), who match partitioned groups in order to
neutralize biases deriving from omitted variables related to ethnicity. In their analysis
they focus on the effect of the rule of law and control of corruption within similar ethnic
groups and find no significant effect of national institutions on development in Africa. By
contrast to their analysis the current paper looks at the long-term effect on development
of the Scramble for Africa itself beyond any sort of pre- and post-colonial institutional
effects, which are ruled out by country and ethnic fixed effects.
3 Data Description
3.1 Data on Ethnic Groups
The Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1959; 1967) represents the main source of data; it
provides information on economic activity and institutional organizations for 412 cultural
clusters, representing 843 ethnic tribes in Africa1. For each group the Atlas reports the
geographical coordinates and maps which have been digitized and made available by Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011). This source is merged with spatial data on African administra-
1Among these 843 groups there are 8 uninhabited regions which will be dropped from the analysis
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tive boundaries from GADM (Global Administrative Database) in order to map ethnic
groups inside national boundaries. The intersection between ethnic location and national
boundaries determines the partitioned groups.
Figure 1 shows all the possible partitioned groups within Africa. A group which has
been partitioned is considered a new ethno-country group even though it shares the same
culture, institutions and economic dependence as the original group. After considering all
the possible partitions, the number of ethno-country groups in Africa increases to 1300,
among which 830 groups have been affected by partition. Appendix 1 reports these groups
and the number of countries between which the group has been partitioned. Of course
it is possible that migration and the displacement of people after conflicts have changed
the spatial distribution of groups, which may impose a limit to our analysis. However,
statistical investigation by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) shows that such an
effect is not particularly severe and the conjectured change of spatial distribution is not
such as to affect the empirical analysis.
Figure 1: Ethnic and Partitioned Groups
Figure 2 shows the effect of the partition for a typical ethnic group. As a result
of the Scramble for Africa, the Aulliminden group has been split into three new ethno-
country groups, which we refer to as Mali-Aulliminden, Niger-Aulliminden and Algeria-
Aulliminden. These groups occupy respectively 14.9 percent, 10.7 percent and 0.007 per-
cent of the total country surface area. According to the existing literature (i.e. Alesina,
Easterly and Matuszesky, 2010) these three groups should be affected by partition in the
same way, given that it is the partition that matters. However, if we consider the hypoth-
esis that the political, social, and cultural salience of the cleavage depends on the size of
the group in relation to the size of the political and social arena in which the groups are lo-
cated, then each of these three groups should be affected by the partition in a different way.
In fact, the size of the Algeria-Aulliminden group is relatively insignificant with respect to
the national political and social structure affecting the prospects of regional development
for this group. As a consequence, the GDP per capita for the Algerian-Alluminden group
should be much smaller than the GDP per capita for the other two Alluminden partitioned
groups.
Figure 2: Partition of the Aulliminden Group
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3.2 Data on GDP
Looking, as we do, at the level of development across groups implies that the measure of
development must be at an ethnic group level. However, there are no sources that can
provide such information directly. Therefore, in order to overcome this limitation we use
estimates about total economic activity from Nighttime Lights satellite imagery provided
by the NOAA/NGDC (Ghosh, Powell, Elvidge, Baugh, Sutton and Anderson, 2010). This
source provides spatially disaggregated 1 km2 data on total economic activity, which is
recorded using a thirty two bit floating number (ranging from 0 to 147.682). In order
to create spatially disaggregated data on economic activity the authors first estimate the
total economic activity for each administrative unit by multiplying the sum of lights (i.e.
the sum of brightness values of the lights for all lit areas) of each administrative unit by a
coefficient obtained from regressing GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and GSP (Gross State
Product) on lights2. Then they spatially distribute “the estimated total economic activity
of each administrative unit into 1 km2 grid cells based on the percentage contribution of
agriculture, the nighttime lights image, and the LandScan population grid” (Ghosh, Powell,
Elvidge, Baugh, Sutton and Anderson 2010, p. 151).
Using light density to obtain sub-national estimates of economic activity has been
quite popular in the last few years (i.e. Henderson, Storeygard and Weil, 2012; Elvidge,
Baugh, Kihn, Kroehl and Davis, 1997; Doll, Muller and Morley, 2006). Henderson, Storey-
gard and Weil (2012) use a similar approach to obtain estimates of GDP growth at sub-
national level for 188 countries over 17 years. They use these estimates to evaluate whether,
over the last 17 years, coastal areas have grown faster than non-coastal areas; whether pri-
mate cities have grown faster than hinterlands; and whether malarial areas have had a
better growth experience than non-malarial areas3. They show that the implications of
using sub-national estimates of GDP growth are quite different from standard results from
the cross-country analysis (i.e Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup, 2000).
The spatial distribution of economic activity in Africa is shown in Figure 3. Darker
areas denote regions of more intense economic activity while lighter areas denote regions
with less or no economic activity (i.e. the Sahara Desert). The advantage of disaggregated
data from an economic activity map is that it provides analytical flexibility given that
2See Chen and Nordhaus (2010) and Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2012) for a more detailed
discussions of regressions used to map lights into a proxy of GDP.
3One of the reasons why estimates of economic activity are normally preferred (rather than using
straight light data) relates to measurement errors in light density related to cross-country cultural dif-
ferences in the use of night-lights, gas flares, differences in lights sensitivity across satellites, blooming
and bleeding, attenuation of lights for areas with low economic activity, etc. (Chen and Nordhaus, 2010;
Henderson, Storeygard and Weil, 2012)
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data can be aggregated to units of different sizes. As a consequence we can use these
disaggregated data in order to construct proxies of development for each ethnic group in
our sample4.
Figure 3: 1km2 Data on Total Economic Activity (converted into a Shapefile)
In order to verify the reliability of our proxy for economic activity5 we compare our data
with a measure of mean light density from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) for the
679 observations in their sample. Table 1 shows the pairwise correlation which is close to
0.89 providing enough evidence on the validity of our proxy for GDP per capita.
Table 1: Pairwise Correlation between Economic Activity and Light Density
4 Partition and Development
4.1 Empirical Strategy
We start our investigation using a cross-group analysis in order to estimate the effect of
the partition on development. The basic model estimated to evaluate such an effect can
be written as:
yi,c = δc + β1Partitioni,c + β2Grp Sharei,c + β3Xi,c + i,c (1)
where yi,c is our proxy for mean economic activity (GDP) for group i in country C ;
δc denotes country-specific effects; Partitioni,c is the dummy for whether the group has
been partitioned or not; Grp Sharei,c represents the population share of the group i in
country C ; and Xi,c is a set of control variables. The error i,c is double clustered in order
to capture potential auto-correlation within ethnicities and countries.
Then we restrict our analysis to partitioned groups only, controlling for ethnic fixed
effects in order to flush out biases related to ethnic characteristics. Therefore the model
to be estimated in this case can be written as:
4The proxy for GDP is constructed using the Zonal Statistics in Qgis 2.01
5The mean economic activity represents the mean value at a 1km2 cell within a polygon (ethnic tribe).
Intuitively this is nothing else that the total economic activity within a polygon (ethnic tribe) divided by
the total number of 1km2 cells within the polygon.
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yi,e,c = δe + β1Grp Sharei,e,c + β2Xi,e,c + i,e,c (2)
where δe now captures ethnic-specific effects and yi,e,c is a measure of development for
the partitioned group i belonging to the ethnic group e within country C. The inclusion
of ethnic fixed effects allows us to deal with omitted variables related to group-specific
characteristics (i.e. pre-colonial institutions, pre-colonial development, etc.) which in
some way may be correlated with the share of partitioned groups. From a certain point
of view the estimator compares measures of development for group i in country C1 with
exactly the same group i but in country C2. Therefore groups are matched on the basis
of similar unobservable characteristics which may affect the estimates.
The variable of interest is Grp Sharei,c. If the partition matters because of the cre-
ation of relatively small groups then we should expect a significant effect on development
of the population share of the group (Grp Sharei,c). However, if it is the partition itself
that matters, then the population share of the resulting group should not matter, given
that the groups resulting from the partition should be affected in a similar way indepen-
dently of their size (same as in Alesina, Easterly and Matuszesky, 2010). Of course, the
case in which both effects (partition and group share) matter is also possible.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for some of the main variables in our model. Al-
most 64 percent of the groups in our dataset have been affected by the partition (Partition
Dummy). The average population share of a typical partitioned group is smaller than 4
percent of the country’s population. The surface area of the typical partitioned group (as
a share of the country’s surface area) is also approximately equal to 4 percent. In fact the
correlation between the share of the surface area and the population share of the group is
almost 0.75. A typical partitioned group has an average population of almost 613,000. At
the same time the average population in the region that is included within the ancestral
ethnic homeland is almost equal to 1 million. As a consequence the population share of
the average partitioned group as a share of the population within the ethnic homeland is
around 64 percent. Even in this case the population share is closely correlated with the
share of the surface area of the partitioned group (as a share of the ethnic homeland sur-
face area) with a correlation of 0.95. The mean economic activity (GDP) is 0.79 and the
population density is almost 51 inhabitants per 2.5 by 2.5 arc-minutes (approximately 25
sq km at the Equator)6. Following Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) we transform
the dependent variable by adding a small number (0.01) to economic activity before taking
6Observations with a population density, GDP and group share equal to 0 are dropped from the
analysis. For this reason in the following tables the number of observations goes down.
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logs in order to correct for the fact that the distribution is skewed toward zero. However
we will also report estimates for the log of the mean economic activity without correcting
for such a small number.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
4.2 Results
Table 3 shows the results from the cross-section analysis in which all groups (partitioned
and not) are pooled together in order to evaluate whether partition matters. In the first
model (Model 1), we control only for country fixed effects and we find a positive and signif-
icant effect of the population share of partitioned groups (Grp Sharei,c) on development,
which increases income by almost 1.6 percent per one standard deviation in the share of
the group. The dummy for whether the group has been partitioned has also a significant
effect on development, reducing GDP per capita by almost 11 percent. In Model 2 we
include controls for the population share of the group, population density estimated (from
the Gridded Population of the World) and a set of geographical controls. Once controlling
for a full set of controls, the effect of the partition turns to be insignificant while the proxy
for the share of the ethnic groups still exerts a positive effect on development. In Model 3
we enter additional controls for types of settlement, dependence on gathering, and juris-
dictional hierarchy beyond the local community, which Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013) find to be closely associated with regional development. Murdock (1959) represents
the source for these additional controls. Even after entering these additional controls,
the results are almost unchanged. There is still an insignificant effect of the partition on
development, while the population share of the group (Grp Sharei,c) exerts a significant
and positive effect on development.
Table 3: Cross-Group Analysis
Given that the cross-group analysis is likely to be affected by omitted variables cor-
related to ethnicity in the following specifications, we restrict our analysis to within parti-
tioned ethnic homelands in order to have more precise estimates of the effect of the share
of the group. Specifically, we confine estimates to the same groups residing on both sides
of state borders, controlling for ethnic-fixed effects. Matching groups which share the same
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unobservable characteristics and the inclusion of ethnic fixed effects allows us to compare
the level of development for the same group on both sides of the border, which from a
practical point of view means that the estimator compares measures of development for
group i in country C1 with exactly the same group i in country C2. Therefore the estima-
tor will represent a sort of quasi-experiment and because of that it will flush away all the
ethnic characteristics that might affect estimates.
The identification of the effect is conditional on the fact that state boundaries are
randomly drawn. Therefore a possible threat to the identification may be related to the
fact that small partitioned groups may have been historically marginalized either in terms
of historical development or geographical factors. In this case the two (or more) partitions
of each ethnicity may not be appropriate counterfactuals. To test whether there are any
systematic differences between small and large partitioned groups in Table 4 we estimate
simple ethnicity fixed-effects regressions associating the variables that reflect geography
and pre-colonial development in the share of partitioned groups. Table 4 reports the
coefficients on the share of the partitioned groups for each specification. Differences in pre-
colonial development (proxied by population density in 1800) do not systematically differ
between groups (Model 1). Differences in terms of geography and disease environment
(proxied by malaria suitability) are also not significantly different (Models 2-5). The
distribution of natural resources is also not systematically linked to the size of partitioned
groups (Model 6). Therefore the lack of systematic differences between small and large
groups seems to support the identification design.
Table 4: Group Share and Pre-colonial/Geographical Characteristics
When we confine estimates to partitioned groups only (Table 5) the coefficient on
the population share of the partitioned group (Grp Sharei,c) is still significant at a 1
percent level and the coefficient remains almost unchanged, with the population share of
the partitioned group increasing income by almost 1.4 percent per one standard deviation
in the former (Model 1). In Model 2 we include country fixed effects in order to rule
out country characteristics (i.e. institutions, national fractionalization, etc.) and the
coefficient on the share of the partitioned group increases to 1.6. Spillover effects related
to the spatial distribution of groups sharing the same ethnicity may affect the error term,
which is therefore likely to be spatially correlated. Because of this problem with the
efficiency of the estimator in Model 3 and Model 4 we use Conleys spatial HAC estimator
(2008) to adjust OLS standard errors for spatial correlation. For each model we use a
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different distance threshold in order to test the robustness of the results. In Model 3 we
use a distance threshold equal to 100km and in Model 4 we increase the threshold to 200km.
Standard errors after controlling for spatial correlation decrease by almost one-half. As a
result, the effect of the size of partitioned groups is still significant at a 1 percent level.
In addition, increasing the distance threshold from 100km (Model 3) to 200km (Model
4) does not seem to have any great effect on standard errors. In Table A1 in the Table
Appendix we re-estimate Model 2 using a quadratic form on the population share of the
partitioned group in order to control for diminishing returns given that the effect may
increase till the share becomes close to 50%(majority of seats in parliament/government)
and then turns either negative or insignificant. The squared form is significant however
the effect seems to be maximized when the share of the group is close to 58%. In our
sample there are only few groups with a share larger than 58% and because of that the
inverted U-shape relation may be the result of these outliers.
Table 5: Matched-Groups
Because the small size of groups may prevent firms and farmholders from taking
advantage of scale economies in production affecting production costs, productivity and
potential for growth, in Table 6 we enter additional controls for the log of the group total
surface area (in m2) (Model 1). In Model 2 we also control for the total population within
the group. Though the two variables are closely correlated with the population share of the
partitioned group the latter still has a significant effect on GDP. A one standard deviation
in the share of the partitioned group increases income by almost 0.11 percent. Finally
in Model 3 we change the functional form of the dependent variable7 and the results still
hold. The estimated effect increases to almost 2 percent for a one percentage change.
This larger effect is likely to reflect the fact that the distribution is skewed toward zero,
increasing the total variance, which justifies our approach of adding a small quantity to
the log in order to normalize the distribution.
Table 6: Controlling for Surface Area, Total Population, and Alternative
Functional form on GDP
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) argue that problems in the definition of eth-
nic boundaries in Murdock (1959, 1967) can affect estimates and hence groups which are
7Instead of the log of (0.01 + GDP) we use the log of GDP
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relatively small should not be used when evaluating levels of development across parti-
tioned groups. In order to deal with this problem they restrict their analysis to groups
with at least 10 percent of their ethnic homeland belonging to more than one country.
Consequently in Table 7 we confine estimates first to groups with at least 5 percent and
then to groups with at least 10 percent of the ethnic homeland belonging to more than
one country.
In Model 1 we consider first groups with at least 5 percent of the ethnic homeland
belonging to more than one country. The number of observations in Model 1 drops to
571, but the effect of the share of groups is still significant at a 1 percent level with an
effect on development almost equal to 1.5 percent per a one percent change in the share
of the group. Then in Model 2 we go on to consider groups with at least 10 percent of
their ethnic homeland belonging to more than one country. In this case the number of
observations drops further, to 483, whereas the coefficient on the size of the group increases
quite significantly (to 2.2 percent) with the effect still significant at 1 percent.
Table 7: Dropping Small Groups
5 Robustness Checks
In order to provide evidence of the robustness of our results we carry out a series of ro-
bustness checks in order to make sure that the effect of the population share of partitioned
groups still retains its significance. First we try to re-estimate the effect of the share of
the partitioned group on development using an IV estimator. Then we check whether the
results still hold using an RD approach. Finally we replace our dependent variable for
luminosity with another dependent variable which is likely to be associated with regional
development.
5.1 Regression Discontinuity
We start our robustness checks using a regressions discontinuity approach (Table 8) which
identifies the effect of the share of groups at the border. In our case the running variable
is the distance from the centroid of an ethnic area to the national border. Following
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010) we present results for specifications
where we use a cubic RD-polynomial in distance to the border (Model 1) and for a local
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linear regression (Model 2 and Model 3) where we confine estimates to groups within 100
km and 50 km from the border respectively. Table 9 reports our estimates. In Model 1
our proxy for the population share of partitioned groups is still significant at a 5% level
exerting an effect on development which is close to 1.5 percent for a percentage change
in the share. In Model 2 we confine estimates to groups within 100 km from the border
in order to estimate the local average effect. The number of observations drops to 728
but the effect of the share of partitioned groups is still significant at a 5% level. Finally
in Model 3 we confine estimates to groups within 50 km from the border. The sample
drops further to 563 observations and the estimated effect is not significant. However,
this insignificant effect is to be imputed to the loss of efficiency of the estimator due to
the smaller number of observations. In fact the point estimate is almost the same as the
one estimated in Model 1, although the standard error increases quite significantly (from
0.48 to 0.99) which reflects the fact that degrees of freedom decrease quite significantly.
There is still a significant economic effect of the population share of partitioned group on
development, though the statistical effect is not significant because of the loss of efficiency
of the estimator.
Table 8: Regression Discontinuity
5.2 Instrumental Variable
As an additional test we use an IV estimator which takes the relative size of the group
(i.e. surface area of the group/country surface area) as an instrument for estimating the
population share of the partitioned group. The relative size of the ethnic group seems
to be a natural instrument for the population share, given that the latter is likely to be
larger for larger groups. In fact the correlation between the two variables is more than
0.75. The close correlation between the size and population share of the partitioned group
is confirmed by the first-stage statistics reported in Table 9. The size of the partitioned
groups has a strong and significant effect on the population share of the partitioned group,
with the latter increasing by almost 0.8 percent per every one percent change in the relative
size of the partitioned group. As a result, the Cragg-Donald F-statistics is much larger
than the Stock and Yogo critical values, avoiding the problems related to biases in the
distribution. With regard to the second-stage statistics, in Model 1 we confine estimates to
all partitioned groups and the effect of the population share is still significant at a 1 percent
level with a coefficient which is close to the one estimated using regression discontinuity.
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In Model 2 and Model 3 we restrict the sample to the partitioned groups representing
either at least 5 percent or at least 10 percent of the ethnic homeland and the effect of the
population share of the partitioned groups is still significant at a 10 percent level at least.
In addition, consistent with the OLS results, the coefficient increases quite significantly
when we confine estimates to partitioned groups representing at least 10 percent of the
ethnic homeland.
Table 9: IV Estimates
One of the potential concerns with the IV results above is related to the fact that the
size of the group may not be completely exogenous, given the effect of the relative size of
the group on economies of scale, natural resources, access to the sea, etc. To explore the
sensitivity of our results to different degrees of violation of the exclusion restriction, we
follow the methods proposed by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012). The idea behind this
sensitivity analysis is to relax the assumption that the direct effect of the instrument on
the dependent variable is equal to zero using different priors for the direct effect of Z on
Y. Therefore, in order to test the sensitivity of the IV results, we need to choose a set of
different priors (δ) about the potential direct effect of the instrument. To choose the set
of different δs we regress the instrument and the endogenous variable on the dependent
variable (controlling for same variables as above) in order to estimate the potential direct
impact of the instrument on the dependent variable. Then we choose a quite large interval
around this estimated effect in order to account for the potential bias of OLS estimates.
The direct effect of the instrument on GDP per capita is negative but not significant
(Table A2 in the Appendix). Given the insignificant effect we consider δ ∈ (−0.8, 0.8) as a
potential interval of priors where the lower-bound is ten times larger than the insignificant
estimated effect in Table A2. Results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in Figure 4.
Dashed lines present the union of 2SLS 95% confidence intervals around the IV coefficient,
using Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) UCI approach. Our IV estimates hold statistically
significant even with substantial departures from the assumption that the direct effect of
the instrument is identically zero. Confidence intervals include zero only for quite large
deviations from the exclusion restriction (δs larger than 0.6) which we consider highly
unlikely. In addition, confidence intervals are relatively stable denoting the strength of the
instrument.
The result of the sensitivity test above together with the fact that the estimated effect
from using an IV is quite similar to the estimated effect from the regressions discontinuity
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approach above seems to provide some support to the idea that the ratio of the surface
area of the group to the country surface area may satisfy the exogeneity condition.
Figure 4: Sensitivity to Violations of the Exclusion Restriction
5.3 Alternative Dependent Variables
The last test consists in replacing the dependent variable with household data from the
Afrobarometer survey to evaluate whether results still hold when we use a different outcome
variable which captures income at an individual level. Appendix A discusses the approach
we use in order to merge ethnic groups from Murdock (1959) with language data from
the Afrobarometer IV8. In Model 1 we regress our variable for the population share of the
group on a variable proxying how often the individual has gone without cash income (Q8E)
controlling for country and ethnic fixed effects and a full set of geographical, district, and
individual controls. The variable ranges from never (equal to 1) to always (equal to 5). In
Model 2, we replace Q8E with Q8D (how often the individual has gone without cooking
fuel). We choose these two variables because we believe that they are closely correlated
to income given that they are directly related to cash income. For both models we find
a significant and negative effect of the share of the group suggesting that the probability
of going without cash and fuel is much lower for individuals within larger groups (Table
10). As a result, the micro-based results with the Afrobarometer data suggest that our
benchmark estimates with satellite light density as the dependent variable are not an
artefact of the luminosity data.
Table 10: Alternative Dependent Variables
6 Channels
We now turn to the analysis of potential channels through which the share of partitioned
groups may affect development. In principle there are several competing theories of why
the share of ethnic groups may matter for development. We group these theories in three
categories.
.
8Unlike the third wave, which provides information on ethnicity, the Afrobarometer IV provides infor-
mation only on the languages of the respondents
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6.1 Ethnic Voting, Political Power and Ethnic Patronage
The share of the group may affect political representation, the provision of local public
goods, investment in infrastructure and therefore regional development. In fact, a number
of studies show a close correlation between ethnic identity voting, representation, and eth-
nic patronage. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) show that the probability of individuals
identifying themselves in ethnic terms increases for every month closer the country is to a
competitive presidential election. Casey (2012) shows that in the 2007 parliamentary elec-
tions the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), which has close ties with the Mende group,
captured 24 of the 25 seats in the South (homeland of the Mende). At the same time,
the All Peoples Congress (APC), which is linked to the Temne group, won 36 out of 39
seats in the Northern Province (homeland of the Temne). Posner (2005) provides evidence
of the close ties between ethnic identity and voting in Zambia, while Long (2012) shows
a similar relationship between ethnic identity and party choice in Kenya. The link be-
tween ethnic identity and voting affects representation in parliament and the likelihood of
cabinet office (Rainer and Trebbi, 2014; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2012) and therefore
ethnic patronage. In fact, there is evidence that ethnically based parties tend to redis-
tribute toward their ethnic group and citizens tend to vote for candidates who represent
their group regardless of their quality. Evidence on ethnic political patronage is provided
by Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel and Morjaria (2015) who find that a large share of road in-
vestments in Kenya may be explained by political appointments and ethno-favouritism
in Kenyan politics. Kramon and Posner (2012) look at education in Kenya. Using data
on the educational attainment of more than fifty thousand Kenyans dating back to the
colonial era and information about the ethnic identities of Kenyan presidents and cabinet
members, they find that having a co-ethnic as president during one’s primary school-age
years is associated with about a one-quarter of a years increase in years of primary school-
ing and substantial increases in the probability of attending and completing both primary
and secondary school. Franck and Rainer (2012) use data from 18 countries to show that
national leaders have significantly increased primary school attendance and reduced infant
mortality within their ethnic group. Hodler and Raschky (2011) use light images from
satellites to see whether national leaders favour their birth region when they take power
and whether this effect is more muted under democracy or autocracy. The problem with
ethnic patronage is that the quality of politicians is likely to be affected when the impos-
sibility of holding politicians to account undermines the quality of political candidates,
which then leads to undesirable governance outcomes such as corruption (Banerjee and
Pande, 2007). As a result the prospects of development are undermined.
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In order to provide basic evidence on whether the share of the group affects the local
provision of public goods and regional investment in infrastructures we use spatial data on
roads and railroads from the FAO-GEONETWORK and we construct a measure for the
distance (in metres) of roads and railroads from the partitioned group. The idea is that
if ethnic patronage matters then small groups which lack political representation should
receive less investment and, therefore, they should be further from roads and railwaysOne
of the problem with our variable for roads is that the data include primary, secondary
and tertiary roads which in some ways is likely to bias downward the effect of the share
of group on the distance from roads given the relative insignificant effect (and the relative
wide coverage) of tertiary roads on transportation costs and development..
To estimate the effect of the share of the group on roads and railroads we use a spatial
HAC estimator in order to take into account the large spatial autocorrelation in roads and
railroads networks. Table 11 presents results which use exactly the same specification (and
controls) as previous models do. Of course, the results are unlikely to be causal given that
we do not exploit any natural experiment. However, the estimated effects point in the
right direction. In Model 1 we show the effect on the distance from roads (in log) and
we find that a one percent increase in the share of the group decreases the distance from
roads by almost 4.7%. In Model 2 we show estimates for the distance from railroads. The
effect of the share of the partitioned group is still significant at a 1% level and the effect
of the share of the group on the distance is negative. A one percent increase in the share
of the partitioned group reduces the distance from roads by almost 7.3%.
Table 11: Partitioned Groups and Infrastructures
6.2 Dual Legal System, Persistence of Informal Institutions,
and Trust
Smaller groups may, however, rely more on customary institutions affecting property rights,
the rule of law, land allocation and therefore development. For example, Mamdani (1996)
argues that the legacy of colonialism in Africa is a “bifurcated state” where decentralized
despotism rules in the rural areas and democratic institutions govern relations in the urban
areas. The creation of customary institutions in the rural areas empowers local chiefs/tribal
leaders and their influence persists nowadays, affecting property rights (Bubb, 2013), the
redistribution of land (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), corruption and communal despotism
(Lange, 2004).
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In order to test the idea that smaller groups are more likely to rely on informal
institutions we use individual data from the Afrobarometer IV. In Model 1 we regress the
population share of the partitioned group on a dummy variable coded one if the tribal
leader has the primary responsibility for collecting income taxes (Q58D). In Model 2,
we replace the dependent variable with a dummy for whether the tribal leader has the
primary responsibility for solving local disputes (Q58E). Finally, in the last two models
we consider whether tribal leaders have the primary responsibility for maintaining law
and order (Q58H) and for allocating land (Q58F). We find a significant effect of the share
of the group on proxies for whether the tribal leader has the primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order (Model 3) and for the allocation of land (Model 4). In fact,
larger groups tend to rely less on tribal leaders with regard to these two dimensions. The
effect on the collection of income taxes is also negative, but not significant (Model 1). The
effect on solving local disputes is also not significant (Model 2).
Table 12: Partitioned Groups and Informal Institutions
When formal institutions fail, networks of socially connected individuals can increase
economic efficiency (Mundi, 2014), leading to a sort of second best9. Network relationships
largely depend on trust given that individuals who trust less will be connected with fewer
nodes. As a result groups which largely rely on informal institutions may have a higher
level of trust since informal institutions tend to rely on human interactions. Therefore,
given the effect of the share of the group on informal institutions we should also observe
a significant relationship between the share of groups and trust. Specifically we should
expect a negative effect of the share of ethnic groups on trust.
To evaluate the effect of the share of groups on trust we consider three questions from
the Afrobarometer IV. The questions ask whether the respondent trusts relatives (Q84A),
trusts other people he knows (Q84B), and trusts individuals from other groups (Q84C)10.
The variables range from not at all (equal to 1) to a lot (equal to 4). In Model 1 we do
not find any significant effect of the share of partitioned groups on the level of trust in
relatives. However the level of trust in other people (Model 2) and the level of trust in
individuals from other groups (Model 3) is significantly affected by the population share
9Fafchamp (2001) shows that network externalities may steer potential investors towards sectors of
activity where they can benefit from these externalities, while Fafchamp and Lund (2003) show a positive
effect of network relationships on risk sharing in the rural Philippines.
10Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014b) use same variables to look at the various historical and
contemporary functions of tribal leaders (chiefs) and illustrate their influence on various aspects of the
economy and the polity
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of the group. In fact, larger groups tend to have a lower level of trust in other individuals
(either from the same or different groups). These results are consistent with the idea that
groups which tend to rely more on informa institutions tend to trust more given that they
tend to rely more on repeated social interactions. Of course, this is not a first best, but
given the evidence on trust and economic growth one can consider the effect of the share
of groups on trust as a sort of second best.
Table 13: Partitioned Groups and Trust
Therefore, to sum up, we find that the level of development of small partitioned groups
may be adversely affected because of ethnic patronage and the persistence of informal
institutions. Still, the effect on communality networks and trust is not likely to hamper
the level of economic development of these groups and should actually have a positive
effect on the level of development. Of course, these results cannot be interpreted as causal
in nature, but they provide some basic evidence related to factors which may explain the
relationship between the share of a group and development.
7 Conclusions
The economic and political science literature has always maintained that the arbitrary
imposition of state boundaries is one of several factors that explain the poor development
in Africa. However the analysis in this paper seems to suggest that it is not the partition
itself that matters for development but the way in which groups have been partitioned.
To be precise, there is a significant effect only in cases where the partition creates small
ethnic groups which lack political representation. From this point of view, a more inclusive
political system could be beneficial in reducing such an effect.
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APPENDIX
Merge with the Afrobarometer
The Afrobarometer (2008) Fourth Round is our main source for formal and informal
institutions11. Different from the Third Round (Afrobarometer, 2005) which provides
data on the ethnicity of individuals (variable Q79), the Fourth Round does not provide a
variable which directly indicates the ethnicity of individuals. However, each individual in
the survey is asked to report his native language. Therefore in order to match individuals
in the Afrobarometer with data on ethnic groups in Murdock (1959, 1967) we rely on
information on native languages12. For each individual in a country-region-district we
check which ethnic group in such country-region-district speaks such a language and then
we match these individuals with ethnic groups in Murdock. Of course, there are practical
issues related to the fact that languages in the Afrobarometer do not always match with
names of ethnic groups in Murdock. Therefore to understand which ethnic group in a
given country-region-district speaks a given language we rely on information from the
Ethnologue and from the Joshua Project.
There are three main indicators of “language/ethnicity” in the Fourth Round which
matter for our analysis. The first one is the language of the respondent (variable Q3);
the second indicator is the language of the interview (Q103); and the third indicator is
a question related to the spoken languages (Q88E). We use the information from these
variables together with the data on country (COUNTRY) and regional bases of each group
(REGION and DISTRICT) in order to merge the data on ethnicity from the Afrobarom-
eter with the data on ethnic groups from Murdock. We first try to match the language
of the respondent (variable Q3) with Murdock’s data on ethnicity, though this is not al-
ways straightforward. In fact, in some cases the reported language is French, English or
Portuguese. For those individuals who report a European language as a spoken language
we then check if the interviewer reports the language in which the interview is conducted
(variable Q103) and if this language is different from French, English or Portuguese. If
the language in which the interview is conducted is different from the three European
languages above then we use this additional information to match data. If the language
of the interview is not reported (or not different from English, French or Portuguese),
11The 20 countries covered by the fourth round (Afrobarometer, 2008) are the following: Benin,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde , Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
12Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) use the same matching strategy. The only difference is that they use
data on ethnicity of individuals (Q79) which is available for the Third Round but not available for the
Fourth Round.
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then we finally look at the spoken languages and we merge the spoken language with the
related ethnicity (this is done for fewer than 50 obs.) We assume that individuals within
a country-region-district speaking the same language belong to the same ethnic group.
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Ethnic and Partitioned Groups 
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Figure 2: Partition of the Aulliminden Group 
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Figure 3: 1 km2 Data on Total Economic Activity (converted into a Shapefile) 
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Figure 4:  Sensitivity to Violations of the Exclusion Restriction 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Pairwise Correlation between Economic Activity and Light Density 
 
  Mean Economic Activity Mean Light Density 
   Mean Economic Activity 1.0000  
 Mean Light Density (MP, 2013) 0.8899 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Mean Economic Activity 1300 .0793029 .3057063 0 7.251074 
Partition-Dummy 1300 .6384615 .4806309 0 1 
Population Share Groups 1297 .0374967 .095127 0 .9865889 
Size Partition Group/Country Size 1300 .0377034 .0813861 1.22e-08 .9343922 
Mean Population Partitioned Group 1297 612611.1 2162498 0 6.15e+07 
Mean Population Ethnic Homeland 1300 1018439 2424008 410.8929 6.15e+07 
Size Part. Group/Pop. Ethnic Home. 1297 .6422514 .4031694 0 1 
Size Part. Group/Ethnic Homeland  1300 .6407692 .3916778 1.71e-06 1 
Population Density 1299 50.91497 93.00702 .0259535 1840.406 
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Table 3: Cross-Group Analysis 
 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
   
 
Partitioned Group Dummy -0.112*** -0.0552 -0.0776 
 
(0.0390) (0.0426) (0.0626) 
Group Population Share 1.703*** 1.648*** 1.600*** 
 
(0.266) (0.276) (0.380) 
    Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 1,291 1,286 710 
R-squared 0.744 0.756 0.790 
Model 1 only includes country fixed effects. 
Model 2 includes country fixed effects, population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, 
mountainous terrain, rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria 
environment, water availability and soil suitability to crops 
Model 3 include all the above plus dummies for settlement, for gathering dependence, and jurisdictional Hierarchy 
from Murdock (1959). 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Group Share and Pre-Colonial/Geographical Characteristics 
 
Dependent Variables: Pop 1800 Malaria Soil Suit. Mountains Water Oil Fields 
Estimation Method: 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       Group Population Share -1.029 0.0377 -0.139 -0.0490 -0.0298 -0.438 
 
(0.961) (0.0497) (0.0930) (0.0389) (0.0338) (0.435) 
       Observations 827 827 827 827 827 827 
R-squared 0.51 0.87 0.44 0.42 0.55 0.39 
 
Dependent Variables are: Population density in 1800 (Model 1), Malaria Suitability (Model 2), Soil Suitability (Model 
3), Mountainous Terrain (Model 4), Presence of Water Bodies (Model 5), and Onshore Oil Fields (Model 6). 
The sample only includes partitioned groups. Ethnic fixed effects included 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Matched-Groups 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
Estimation Method:  OLS OLS Spatial HAC Spatial HAC 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   
 
 Group Population Share 1.451*** 1.620*** 1.620*** 1.620*** 
 
(0.393) (0.455) (0.283) (0.324) 
     Ethnic Fixed Effects                            YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
R-squared 0.824 0.871 0.991 0.991 
Additional controls include: Population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability to crops. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Controlling for Surface Area, Total Population, and Alternative Functional form 
on GDP 
 
Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Vars: Log (0.01+GDP) Log (0.01+GDP) Log (GDP) 
   
 
Group Population Share 1.196*** 1.106** 2.037*** 
 
(0.460) (0.454) (0.688) 
    Ethnic Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 826 816 816 
R-squared 0.879 0.883 0.858 
Additional controls include: Population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability to crops. Model 1 also includes the log of the total surface area and Model 2 includes all the 
previous controls plus total population within the group. The latter controls are not included in Model 3.  
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Dropping Small Groups 
 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
 Estimation Method: Spatial HAC Model 1 Model 2 
   Partitioned Group Pop. Share 1.547*** 2.188*** 
 
(0.368) (0.380) 
   Tribe Fixed Effects YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 571 483 
R-squared 0.993 0.994 
Sample Groups 5% of homeland  Groups 10% of homeland 
 
Additional controls include: Population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability to crops. 
Conley (2008) HAC Spatial Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The distance threshold for both models is 100km. 
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Table 8: Regression Discontinuity  
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
   
 
Group Population Share 1.556*** 1.656*** 1.434 
 
(0.478) (0.531) (0.999) 
    Ethnic Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 816 728 563 
R-squared 0.744 0.756 0.790 
Method Cubic Polynomial Within 100km Within 50km 
Additional Controls Include: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
distance from the sea, rugged terrain, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability. 
In Model 1 we use a cubic polynomial on the distance from centroid distance of the group from the border.  
In Model 2 and Model 3 we estimate the local average effect using a local linear regression discontinuity approach. 
In this case the distance from the border is set to 100km in Model 2 and 50km in Model 3. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: IV Estimates 
 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Economic Activity) 
 Estimation Method: IV Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Partitioned Group Pop. Share 1.272*** 1.105* 1.831*** 
 
(0.365) (0.636) (0.881) 
 
First-stage Stats and Diagnostic Tests 
Size Partitioned Group 0.8542*** 0.8491*** 0.6634*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0786) (0.1283) 
Anderson Canon LR Stats 812.239 412.869 123.79 
Cragg-Donal F-Stats 1371.448 592.951 137.600 
Stock and Yogo Critical Value 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Tribe Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 816 571 483 
R-squared 0.431 0.386 0.394 
Sample 
 
Partitioned 
Groups 
Groups 5% of 
homeland 
 Groups 10% of 
homeland 
Additional Controls Include: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
distance from the sea, rugged terrain, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Alternative Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable: Ever Been Without Cash Ever Been Without Fuel 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 
   Partitioned Group Pop. Share -0.940** -0.720*** 
 
(0.450) (0.194) 
   Ethnic Fixed Effects YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 19,387 19,395 
R-squared 0.27 0.13 
 
Additional controls include:  
1) Geographical variables: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous 
terrain, rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, 
water availability and soil suitability to crops 
2) District controls: whether in the PSU/EA there is electricity, piped water, a sewage system, cell phone 
service, post office, health clinic, police station, etc. 
3) Individual controls: age, gender, occupation, education, support for democracy, country and personal 
economic conditions, trust others, etc. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 11: Partitioned Groups and Infrastructures 
Dependent Variable: Distance from Road Distance from Railroad 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 
   Partitioned Group Pop. Share -4.699*** -7.291** 
 
(1.807) (2.809) 
   Ethnic Fixed Effects YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 821 821 
R-squared 0.68 0.91 
Additional Controls Include: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
distance from the sea, rugged terrain, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Partitioned Groups and Informal Institutions 
Dependent Variable: Ethnic 
Leaders Have Primary Resp. for: 
Collect 
Income tax 
Solving 
Disputes 
Maintain Rule 
and Law 
Allocation  
of Land 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   
 
 Group Population Share -0.0042 0.0676 -0.278** -0.0923** 
 
(0.0296) (0.104) (0.125) (0.0461) 
     Ethnic Fixed Effects                            YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 18,544 19,018 18,901 18,959 
R-squared 0.04 0.21 0.20 0.07 
 
Additional controls include:  
1) Geographical variables: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous 
terrain, rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, 
water availability and soil suitability to crops, group mean GDP. 
2) District controls: whether in the PSU/EA there is electricity, piped water, a sewage system, cell phone 
service, post office, health clinic, police station, etc. 
3) Individual controls: age, gender, occupation, education, support for democracy, country and personal 
economic conditions, trust others, etc. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 13: Partitioned Groups and Trust 
Dependent Variable: Trust Relatives Trust Others Trust Other Groups 
 Estimation Method: OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Group Share Population -0.214 -0.488*** -1.229*** 
 
(0.158) (0.177) (0.180) 
    Tribe Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Observations 19,416 19,373 19,258 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Additional controls include:  
1) Geographical variables: population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous 
terrain, rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, 
water availability and soil suitability to crops, group mean GDP. 
2) District controls: whether in the PSU/EA there is electricity, piped water, a sewage system, cell phone 
service, post office, health clinic, police station, etc. 
3) Individual controls: age, gender, occupation, education, support for democracy, country and personal 
economic conditions, etc. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table Appendix 
 
Table A1: Quadratic Form on Population Share 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
Estimation Method:  OLS 
  Model 1 
  Group Population Share 4.447*** 
 
(1.010) 
Group Population Share Squared -3.869*** 
 
(1.391) 
  Ethnic Fixed Effects Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 816 
R-squared 0.877 
Additional controls include: Population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability to crops. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Controlling for the Surface Area of the Group. 
Dependent Var: Log (0.01+Mean Economic Activity) 
Estimation Method:  OLS 
  Model 1 
  
Group Population Share 
 
2.213***  
(0.706) 
 
 
Ratio Group Surface Area to Country Surface Area  
 
 -0.0804 
 
  (0.753) 
  Ethnic Fixed Effects Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 816 
R-squared 0.872 
Additional controls include: Population density in 2000, distance from the capital, mean slope, mountainous terrain, 
rugged terrain, distance from the sea, onshore oil fields, population in 1800, malaria environment, water availability 
and soil suitability to crops. 
Double Clustered Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Data Description 
 
Data Source 
Variables Description Source 
Ethnic Groups Map Murdock (1959,1967) 
State Boundaries Global Administrative 
Database (GADM) 
Economic 
Activity 
Satellite Imagery of light density from the National Geophysical Data 
Center (NOAA/NGDC) 
Ghosh et al. (2010) 
Population Density Gridded Population 
of the World (GPW) - 
SEDAC 
   
Partition 
Dummy 
Intersection between state boundaries and ethnic groups location Murdock (1959,1967) 
+ GADM 
Group Share Group Area/Country Area 
Mountains 
/Terrains 
Digital Elevation Model  FAO-GeoNetwork 
Rugged Terrain Digital Elevation Model  Computed using QGIS 
DEM model plugin 
Water 
Availability 
Water Basins FAO-GeoNetwork 
Distance from 
the Sea 
Distance to the Nearest Coast NASA Ocean Biology 
Processing Group 
Distance from 
the Capital 
Euclidean Distance from the Capital CEPII (cepii.fr) 
Population 
Density in 
1800 
History Database of the Global Environment  HYDE 
Onshore Oil 
Fields 
Number of Oil Fields/Group Surface Area UCDP/PRIO 
Environmental 
Suitability to 
Malaria 
1km2 Spatial Data from a biological model which incorporates the 
effect of climate on 1) vector lifespan and 2) the duration of P. 
falciparum sporogeny. 
Oxford Atlas Malaria 
Project 
Crop Suitability  Digital Soil Map FAO 
GEONETWORK 
Settlement Types, Dependence 
on Gathering and Juridical  
Hierarchy  
Murdock (1959, 1967) 
Roads and Railways   Spatial Data (Shape Lines) FAO-
GEONETWORK 
Proxies for Informal  
Institutions                 Questions Q58D, Q58E, Q58F, Q58H 
The Afrobarometer (IV 
Round) 
Proxies for Individual  Questions Q8D, Q8E 
Income 
The Afrobarometer (IV 
Round) 
Proxies for Trusts       Questions Q84A, Q84B, Q84C The Afrobarometer (IV 
Round) 
Regional 
Provision of 
Public Goods 
Dummies for the provision of electricity, of piped water, a sewage 
system, health clinics, paved terrain, schools, whether there are any 
police or soldier stations, etc. 
The Afrobarometer (IV 
Round) 
Individual 
Effects 
Dummies for age, sex, trust in democracy, employment status, trust in 
peers, education, urban, etc. 
The Afrobarometer (IV 
Round) 
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Appendix II: Partitioned Ethnic Groups and Number of Countries 
 
 
 
Name Countries Name Countries 
 
  
  ABABDA 2 LAMBYA 3 
ACHOLI 2 LENDU 2 
ADAMAWA 3 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 2 
ADARAWA 2 LIMBA 2 
ADELE 2 LIPTAKO 2 
AFAR 3 LOBI 2 
AHAGGAREN 2 LOGO 2 
ALGERIANS 2 LOMWE 2 
ALUR 2 LOTUKO 2 
AMBA 2 LUAPULA 2 
AMBO 2 LUCHAZI 2 
AMER 2 LUGBARA 3 
AMHARA 2 LUMBO 2 
ANA 2 LUNDA 2 
ANUAK 2 LUNGU 2 
ANYANG 2 LUO 3 
ANYI 2 LUVALE 3 
ARAD 2 MABA 2 
ASBEN 2 MADI 2 
ASSINI 2 MAKONDE 2 
ATTA 2 MAKUA 2 
ATYUTI 2 MALINKE 6 
AULLIMINDEN 3 MAMBILA 2 
AUSHI 2 MAMPRUSI 2 
AVATIME 2 MANDARA 2 
AZANDE 3 MANGA 2 
AZJER 3 MANYIKA 2 
BABUKUR 2 MASA 2 
BAJUN 2 MASAI 2 
BAKWE 2 MASALIT 2 
BALANTE 2 MASHI 2 
BAMBARA 2 MASINA 3 
BANDA 3 MATAKAM 2 
BANGI 2 MATENGO 2 
BANYUN 2 MBAGANI 2 
BANZIRI 2 MBERE 3 
BARABRA 2 MBUKUSHU 3 
BARARETTA 3 MBUNDA 2 
BARGU 4 MEBAN 2 
BASARI 2 MENDE 3 
BASHI 3 MERARIT 2 
BATA 2 MIJERTEIN 2 
BAYA 2 MINIANKA 3 
BERABER 2 MITTU 2 
BERABISH 2 MOBA 4 
BERIBERI 2 MOBER 2 
BERTA 2 MOMBERA 2 
BIAFADA 2 MOSSI 2 
BIDEYAT 4 MPEZENI 2 
BIRIFON 3 MUNDANG 2 
BOBO 2 MUNDU 2 
BOKI 2 MURLE 2 
BONDJO 2 MUSGU 2 
BONI 2 NAFANA 2 
BORAN 2 NALU 2 
BRONG 2 NAMA 2 
BUDUMA 2 NARON 2 
BUEM 2 NAUDEBA 2 
BULOM 2 NDAU 2 
BUSA 2 NDEBELE 2 
BUSANSI 3 NDEMBU 3 
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BWAKA 3 NDOGO 3 
CHAAMBA 2 NDUKA 2 
CHAGA 2 NEFUSA 2 
CHAKOSSI 3 NGALA 2 
CHAMBA 2 NGAMA 2 
CHEWA 3 NGBANDI 2 
CHIGA 3 NGERE 3 
CHOKWE 2 NGUMBA 2 
CHUABO 2 NGWAKETSE 2 
COMORIANS 2 NGWATO 3 
DAFI 2 NKOLE 3 
DAGARI 2 NSENGA 3 
DAGOMBA 2 NSUNGLI 2 
DAN 2 NUER 2 
DARI 2 NUKWE 4 
DAZA 2 NUSAN 3 
DELIM 2 NYAKYUSA 2 
DENDI 3 NYANGIYA 2 
DIALONKE 3 NYANJA 2 
DIDINGA 3 NYASA 3 
DIGO 2 NYORO 2 
DIOLA 3 NZANKARA 2 
DOGON 2 ODODOP 2 
DRAWA 2 OGADEN 2 
DUI-MENIA 2 PANDE 2 
DUMA 2 PARE 2 
DZEM 3 POPO 2 
EGBA 3 PUKU 3 
EKOI 2 REGA 2 
ESA 3 REGEIBAT 2 
EWE 2 RENDILE 2 
FAJULU 3 RESHIAT 3 
FANG 4 RIYAH 3 
FIGIG 2 ROLONG 2 
FILALA 2 RONGA 3 
FON 3 RUANDA 5 
FOUTADJALON 4 RUFFA 2 
FUNGON 2 RUNDI 4 
FUR 2 RUNGA 3 
GADAMES 3 SAADI 2 
GANDA 2 SAB 2 
GERI 2 SABEI 2 
GIL 2 SAHO 2 
GISU 2 SAMO 2 
GOBU 2 SANGA 3 
GOLA 2 SANUSI 2 
GOMANI 2 SEGEJU 2 
GREBO 2 SEKE 2 
GRUNSHI 2 SENUFO 3 
GUDE 2 SERER 2 
GUIN 2 SHAMBALA 2 
GULA 2 SHASHI 2 
GULE 2 SHEBELLE 2 
GUMUZ 2 SHILA 2 
GUN 2 SHUWA 3 
GURENSI 3 SIA 2 
GURMA 4 SILA 2 
GUSII 2 SINZA 2 
HA 2 SIWA 2 
HABBANIA 3 SOKOTO 2 
HADENDOWA 2 SOMBA 2 
HAMAMA 2 SONGHAI 3 
HAMYAN 2 SONINKE 3 
HAUSA 2 SONJO 2 
HAWIYA 2 SOTHO 2 
HAYA 3 SUBIA 4 
HEMAT 2 SUNDI 2 
53 
 
HERERO 2 SURI 2 
HIECHWARE 2 SUSU 3 
HLENGWE 3 SWAZI 3 
HOLO 2 TABWA 2 
IBIBIO 2 TAJAKANT 4 
IFORA 2 TAMA 2 
IMRAGEN 3 TAWARA 2 
ISHAAK 2 TEDA 3 
IWA 2 TEKE 3 
JERID 2 TEKNA 2 
JIE 2 TEM 2 
KABRE 2 TENDA 2 
KAKA 2 THONGA 3 
KANEMBU 3 TIENGA 3 
KANURI 2 TIGON 2 
KAONDE 2 TIGRINYA 3 
KAPSIKI 2 TIV 2 
KARA 2 TLHARU 2 
KARAMOJONG 2 TLOKWA 3 
KARE 2 TOMA 2 
KEBU 2 TONGA 2 
KENTU 2 TOPOTHA 3 
KGALAGADI 2 TORO 2 
KGATLA 2 TRIBU 2 
KHARGA 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 2 
KISI 2 TUBURI 2 
KISSI 3 TUKULOR 2 
KOBA 2 TUMBUKA 2 
KOMA 2 TUNISIANS 2 
KOMONO 2 TURKANA 2 
KONGO 3 UDALAN 3 
KONJO 2 VAI 2 
KONKOMBA 2 VENDA 2 
KONO 2 VERE 2 
KONYANKE 2 VILI 4 
KORANKO 2 WAKURA 2 
KOREKORE 3 WANGA 2 
KOTA 2 WIDEKUM 2 
KOTOKO 2 WOLOF 2 
KOTOPO 2 WUM 2 
KOYAM 2 XAM 2 
KPELLE 3 YAKA 2 
KRAN 2 YAKOMA 2 
KREISH 2 YALUNKA 2 
KUKU 2 YAO 3 
KULANGO 3 YOMBE 3 
KUNDA 3 ZAGHAWA 2 
KUNG 2 ZEKARA 2 
KUNTA 2 ZENEGA 2 
KUNYI 2 ZERMA 2 
KWANGARE 2 ZIMBA 2 
LAKA (ADAMAWA 3 ZULU 2 
LALA 2 ZUMPER 2 
LAMBA 2 
    Total 830 
 
 
